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Abstract—In modern cryptography, the secret sharing scheme
is an important cryptographic primitive and it is used in various
situations. In this paper, a timed-release secret sharing scheme
(TR-SS) with information-theoretic security is first studied. TR-
SS is a secret sharing scheme with the property that participants
more than a threshold number can reconstruct a secret by
using their shares only when the time specified by a dealer has
come. Specifically, in this paper we first introduce a model and
formalization of security for TR-SS based on the traditional
secret sharing scheme and information-theoretic timed-release
security. We also derive tight lower bounds on the sizes of shares,
time-signals, and entities’ secret-keys required for TR-SS. In
addition, we propose a direct construction for TR-SS. Our direct
construction is optimal in the sense that the construction meets
equality in each of our bounds. As a result, it is shown that
the timed-release security can be realized without any additional
redundancy on the share-size.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secret sharing schemes were proposed independently by
Shamir [1] and Blakley [2]. In a (k, n)-threshold secret sharing
((k, n)-SS for short) scheme (e.g. see [1]), a dealer shares
a secret among all participants, and then, k participants can
reconstruct the secret while any k − 1 participants obtain no
information on the secret. Since Shamir and Blakley proposed
secret sharing schemes, various research on them have been
reported.
On the other hand, “time” is intimately related to our lives.
We get up, eat something, do a job, and get asleep at a time of
our (or someone’s) choice. From the above reason, it appears
that cryptographic protocols associated with “time” are useful
and meaningful. Actually, as those protocols, timed-release
cryptographic protocols introduced in [3] are well-known.
From the above discussion, it is useful and important to
consider a secret sharing scheme with timed-release security.
Therefore, we study such a scheme, which we call a timed-
release secret sharing (TR-SS) scheme, in this paper.
Timed-Release Security. Informally, the goal of timed-release
cryptography is to securely send a certain information into
the future. For instance, in timed-release encryption, a sender
transmits a ciphertext so that a receiver can decrypt it when
the time which the sender specified has come, and the re-
ceiver cannot decrypt it before the time. The timed-release
cryptography was first proposed by May [3] in 1993, and after
that, Rivest et al. [4] developed it in a systematic and formal
way. Since Rivest et al. gave a formal definition of timed-
release encryption (TRE) in [4], various research on timed-
release cryptography including timed-release signatures (e.g.,
[5], [6]) and timed-release encryption have been done based
on computational security. In particular, TRE in the public-
key setting has been recently researched on intensively (e.g.,
[7], [8], [9]). Recently, information-theoretically (or uncondi-
tionally) secure timed-release cryptography was proposed by
Watanabe et al. [10]. In addition, they investigated not only an
encryption but also a key-agreement and an authentication code
with information-theoretic timed-release security. To the best
of our knowledge, however, there is no paper which reports
on the study of secret sharing schemes with (information-
theoretic) timed-release security.
Our Contribution. In adding timed-release functionality to
secret sharing schemes, we conceive the following two types
of schemes.
One is a secret sharing scheme such that information
associated with time (called time-signals) is required when-
ever a secret is reconstructed, which means a secret sharing
scheme with a simple combination of traditional secret sharing
functionality and timed-release functionality. For realizing it,
we propose (k, n)-TR-SS in this paper. In (k, n)-TR-SS, a
dealer can specify positive integers k, n with k ≤ n, where
n is the number of participants and k is a threshold value,
and future time when a secret can be recovered; and the secret
can be reconstructed from at least k shares and a time-signal
at the specified time. On the other hand, participants cannot
reconstruct the secret without the time-signal even if they can
obtain all shares. Specifically, we define a model and security
notions of (k, n)-TR-SS, and we derive lower bounds on the
sizes of shares, time-signals, and entities’ secret-keys required
for (k, n)-TR-SS. Moreover, we provide a direct construction
of (k, n)-TR-SS, which is constructed by using polynomials
over finite fields and provably secure in our security definition.
In addition, we show that the direct construction meets the
lower bounds on the sizes of shares, time-signals, and entities’
secret-keys with equalities. Therefore, it turns out that our
lower bounds are tight, and that the direct construction is
optimal.
Another one is a hybrid TR-SS, which means a secret
sharing scheme in which traditional secret sharing functionality
and timed-release functionality are simultaneously realized. In
our hybrid TR-SS, a secret can be reconstructed, if one of the
following condition is satisfied: a secret can be reconstructed
from k1 shares and a time-signal at a specified time as in
the (k1, n)-TR-SS; or a secret can be reconstructed from k2
shares as in the traditional (k2, n)-SS. Hence, we consider two
threshold values k1, k2 to define a model of the hybrid TR-
SS, and we propose (k1, k2, n)-TR-SS as such a model, where
k1 ≤ k2 ≤ n. Specifically, in (k1, k2, n)-TR-SS, a dealer
can specify future time, and arbitrarily chooses k1, k2 and
n. At least k1 (and less than k2) participants can reconstruct a
secret with a time-signal at the specified time, and at least k2
participants can reconstruct a secret without any time-signal
(i.e. they can reconstruct from only their shares). Specifically,
we define a model and security notions of (k1, k2, n)-TR-
SS, and we derive tight lower bounds on the sizes of shares,
time-signals, and entities’ secret-keys required for (k1, k2, n)-
TR-SS. Moreover, we provide two direct constructions of
(k1, k2, n)-TR-SS: One is a naive construction, which is very
simple, however, does not meet the above lower bounds with
equalities; The other is an optimal construction, which meets
the above lower bounds with equalities.
In particular, a theoretically-interesting point in our results
includes that the timed-release security can be realized without
any additional redundancy on the share-size in both schemes.
Applications of TR-SS. Our TR-SS is a secret sharing scheme
with timed-release property. We consider one of particular
applications of TR-SS. Recently, in a real world setting, secret
sharing schemes have been considered as applications, espe-
cially for cloud computing (e.g., secure data storage services).
As represented by big data, information sharing via cloud
computing has been developing over recent years. By applying
TR-SS, an information provider can specify arbitrary time
when the information is shared. Actually, the following case
is known: Some companies share their big data, which usually
includes sensitive data, and that each company uses shared data
for its own business. Then, by using TR-SS, each company
can specify future time when other companies can use such
sensitive information. Therefore, we can say that TR-SS can
provide more flexible security than traditional secret sharing
schemes.
Furthermore, TR-SS can also provide cryptographic pro-
tocols with timed-release functionality. For example, we can
construct information-theoretically secure TRE in the two-user
setting from (1, 1)-TR-SS and the one-time pad as follows. For
a plaintext M and a shared key K , a sender chooses a random
number r whose length is equal to the plaintext-length, and
computes a cipertext C := M ⊕ r⊕K . Then, the sender spec-
ifies future time, and he generates one share from the secret r
by (1, 1)-TR-SS. A receiver can compute C ⊕K =M ⊕ r by
using the shared key K in advance, however, he cannot obtain
M until the specified time comes since he can get r only
after the specified time. In a similar way, it is expected that
TR-SS is useful for building other timed-release cryptographic
protocols such as timed-release authentication code [10] in the
two-user setting, and that TR-SS might be able to provide some
new timed-release cryptographic protocols, e.g., timed-release
threshold encryption.
Organization of this paper. The rest of this paper is organized
as follows. In Sections II and III, we describe (k, n)-TR-SS
and (k1, k2, n)-TR-SS, respectively, which are based on the
ideas according to [1], [11], [10]. Specifically, in each section,
we define a model and security of each scheme, and derive
lower bounds on the sizes of shares, time-signals and secret-
keys required for each scheme, respectively. Furthermore, we
propose a direct construction of each scheme, and show it is
provably secure and optimal. Finally, in Section IV, we give
concluding remarks of this paper.
Notation. Throughout this paper, we use the following no-
tation. Generally speaking, X indicates a random variable
which takes values in X (e.g., A,B, and C are random
variables which take values in A,B, and C, respectively). For
any finite set Z and arbitrary non-negative integers z1, z2, let
PS(Z, z1, z2) := {Z ⊂ Z|z1 ≤ |Z| ≤ z2} be the family of
all subsets of Z whose cardinality is at least z1 but no more
than z2.
II. (k, n)-TIMED-RELEASE SECRET SHARING SCHEME
In this section, we propose a model and a security definition
of (k, n)-TR-SS. In (k, n)-TR-SS, a time-signal at the speci-
fied time is always required when a secret is reconstructed. In
other words, a secret cannot be reconstructed without a time-
signal at the specified time even if there are all shares.
A. The Model and Security Definition
First, we introduce the model of (k, n)-TR-SS. Unlike
traditional secret sharing schemes [2], [1], we assume that there
is a trusted authority (or a trusted initializer) TA whose role
is to generate and to distribute secret-keys of entities. We call
this model the trusted initializer model as in [12].In (k, n)-
TR-SS, there are n + 3 entities, a dealer D, n participants
P1, P2, . . . , Pn, a time-server TS for broadcasting time-signals
at most τ times and a trusted initializer TA, where k, n and τ
are positive integers. In this paper, we assume that the identity
of each user Pi is also denoted by Pi.
Informally, (k, n)-TR-SS is executed as follows. First, TA
generates secret-keys on behalf of D and TS. After distributing
these keys via secure channels, TA deletes it in his memory.
Next, D specifies future time, as D wants, when a secret
is reconstructed by participants, and he generates n shares
from the secret by using his secret-key. And, D sends each
share to each participant respectively via secure channels. The
time-server TS periodically broadcasts a time-signal which is
generated by using his secret-key. When the specified time has
come, at least k participants can compute the secret by using
their shares and the time-signal of the specified time.
Formally, we give the definition of (k, n)-TR-SS as fol-
lows. In this model, let P := {P1, P2, . . . , Pn} be a set of all
participants. And also, S is a set of possible secrets with a
probability distribution PS , and SK is a set of possible secret-
keys. T := {1, 2, . . . , τ} is a set of time. Let U (t)i be the set of
possible Pi’s shares at the time t ∈ T . Also, Ui :=
⋃τ
t=1 U
(t)
i
is a set of possible Pi’s shares for every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
and let U :=
⋃n
i=1 Ui. In addition, T I
(t) is a set of time-
signals at time t, and let T I :=
⋃τ
t=1 T I
(t)
. Furthermore,
for any subset of participants J = {Pi1 , . . . , Pij} ⊂ P ,
U
(t)
J := U
(t)
i1
× · · · × U
(t)
ij
denotes the set of possible shares
held by J .
Definition 1 ((k, n)-TR-SS). A (k, n)-timed-release secret
sharing scheme ((k, n)-TR-SS) Π involves n + 3 entities,
TA,D, P1, . . . , Pn, and TS, and consists of four phases,
Initialize, Extract, Share, and Reconstruct, and five finite
spaces, S,SK,U , T , and T I. Π is executed based on the
above phases as follows.
a) Initialize. TA generates a secret-key sk ∈ SK for TS
and D. These keys are distributed to corresponding
entities via secure channels. After distributing these
keys, TA deletes them from his memory. And, D and
TS keep their keys secret, respectively.1
b) Share. A dealer D randomly selects a secret s ∈ S
according to PS , and chooses k and n. If D wants the
secret s to be reconstructed by participants at future
time t ∈ T , on input the secret s ∈ S, specified time
t ∈ T and a secret-key sk, D computes a share u(t)i ∈
U
(t)
i for every Pi (i = 1, 2, . . . , n). And then, D
sends a pair of the share and specified time, (u(t)i , t),
to Pi (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) via a secure channel.2
c) Extract. For broadcasting a time-signal at each time t,
TS generates a time-signal ts(t) ∈ T I(t) by using his
secret-key sk and time t ∈ T , where for simplicity
we assume that ts(t) is deterministically computed by
t and sk.
d) Reconstruct. At the specified time t, any set of
participants A = {Pi1 , . . . , Pij} ∈ PS(P , k, n)
can reconstruct the secret s by using their shares
u
(t)
i1
, . . . , u
(t)
ij
(k ≤ j ≤ n) and a time-signal ts(t)
at the specified time.
In the above model, we assume that Π meets the following
correctness property: If D correctly completes the phase Share
and TS correctly completes the phase Extract, then, for all
possible i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, t ∈ T , s ∈ S, u(t)i ∈ Ui,
and mk(t) ∈ T I(t), it hold that any A ∈ PS(P , k, n)
will correctly reconstruct the secret s at the end of phase
Reconstruct, namely,
H(S | U
(t)
A , T I
(t)) = 0.
Next, we formalize a security definition of (k, n)-TR-SS
based on the idea of the information-theoretic timed-release
security [10] and secret sharing schemes (e.g. see [11]). In
(k, n)-TR-SS, we consider the following two kinds of security.
The first security which we consider is basically the same
as that of the traditional (k, n)-SS: less than k participants
cannot obtain any information on a secret. In addition to this,
as the second security we want to require that even at least k
participants cannot obtain any information on a secret before
the specified time comes (i.e., before a time-signal at the
specified time is received), since we consider timed-release
security in this paper. Therefore, we formally define secure
(k, n)-TR-SS as follows.
Definition 2 (Security of (k, n)-TR-SS). Let Π be (k, n)-
TR-SS. Π is said to be secure if the following conditions are
satisfied:
1If we consider a situation in which TS is trusted and TS has functionality
of generating keys and distributing them to participants by secure private
channels, we can identify TA with TS in the situation. However, there may
be a situation in which the roles of TA and TS are quite different (e.g.,
TA is a provider of secure data storage service and TS is a time-signal
broadcasting server). Therefore, we assume two entities TA and TS in our
model to capture various situations.
2More precisely, there is no need to keep the specified time confidential (D
only has to send shares via secure channels).
(i) For any F ∈ PS(P , 1, k−1) and any t ∈ T , it holds
that
H(S | U
(t)
F , T I
(1), . . . , T I(τ)) = H(S).
(ii) For any A ∈ PS(P , k, n) and any t ∈ T , it holds
that
H(S | U
(t)
A , T I
(1), . . . , T I(t−1), T I(t+1), . . . , T I(τ))
= H(S).
Intuitively, the meaning of two conditions (i) and (ii) in
Definition 2 is explained as follows. (i) No information on a
secret is obtained by any set of less than k participants, even if
they obtain time-signals at all the time; (ii) No information on
a secret is obtained by any set of more than k−1 participants,
even if they obtain time-signals at all the time except the
specified time.3
Remark 1. We can also consider the following security defi-
nition (the condition (iii)) instead of (i): No information on a
secret is obtained by collusion of TS and any set of less than
k participants, namely, this is defined as follows.
(iii) For any F ∈ PS(P , 1, k − 1) and for any t ∈ T , it
holds that
H(S | U
(t)
F , SK) = H(S).
Note that the condition (iii) is stronger than (i). However, we
do not consider (iii) in this paper because of the following
two reasons: first, the condition (i) is more natural than (iii),
since it does not seem natural to consider the situation that
any set of less than k participants colludes with TS in the
real world; and secondly, our lower bounds in Theorem ??
are still valid even under the conditions (ii) and (iii), in
other words, even if we consider the conditions (ii) and (iii),
we can derive the same lower bounds in Theorem 1 since
Definition 2 is weaker. Interestingly, our direct construction
in Section II-C also satisfies (iii), and tightness of our lower
bounds and optimality of our direct construction will be valid
not depending on the choice of the condition (i) or (iii).
Furthermore, we do not have to consider an attack by dishonest
TS only, since TS’s master-key is generated independently of
a secret.
B. Lower Bounds
In this section, we show lower bounds on sizes of shares,
time-signals, and secret-keys required for secure (k, n)-TR-SS
as follows.
Theorem 1. Let Π be any secure (k, n)-TR-SS. Then, for any
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and for any t ∈ T , we have
(i) H(U
(t)
i ) ≥ H(S), (ii) H(TI
(t)) ≥ H(S),
(iii) H(SK) ≥ τH(S).
The proof follows from the following lemmas.
3In this sense, we have formalized the security notion stronger than the
security that any set of more than k − 1 participants cannot obtain any
information on a secret before the specified time, as is the same approach
considered in [10].
Lemma 1. H(U (t)i ) ≥ H(S) for any i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and
any t ∈ T .
Proof. The proof of this lemma can be proved in a way similar
to the proof in [11, Theorem 1]. For arbitrary i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
we take a subset Bi ∈ PS(P\{Pi}, k−1, k−1) of participants.
Then, for any t ∈ T , we have
H(U
(t)
i ) ≥ H(U
(t)
i | U
(t)
Bi
, T I(t))
≥ I(S;U
(t)
i | U
(t)
Bi
, T I(t))
= H(S | U
(t)
Bi
, T I(t)) (1)
= H(S), (2)
where (1) follows from the correctness of (k, n)-TR-SS and
(2) follows from the condition (i) in Definition 2. 
Lemma 2. H(TI(t) | TI(1), . . . , T I(t−1)) ≥ H(S) for any
t ∈ T . In particular, H(TI(t)) ≥ H(S) for any t ∈ T .
Proof. For any A ∈ PS(P , k, n) and any t ∈ T , we have
H(TI(t)) ≥H(TI(t) | TI(1), . . . , T I(t−1))
≥H(TI(t) | U
(t)
A , T I
(1), . . . , T I(t−1))
≥I(S;TI(t) | U
(t)
A , T I
(1), . . . , T I(t−1))
=H(S | U
(t)
A , T I
(1), . . . , T I(t−1)) (3)
=H(S), (4)
where (3) follows from the correctness of (k, n)-TR-SS and
(4) follows from the condition (ii) in Definition 2. 
Lemma 3. H(SK) ≥ τH(S).
Proof. We have
H(SK) ≥ I(TI(1), . . . , T I(τ);SK)
= H(TI(1), . . . , T I(τ))−H(TI(1), . . . , T I(τ) | SK)
= H(TI(1), . . . , T I(τ))
=
τ∑
t=1
H(TI(t) | TI(1), . . . , T I(t−1))
≥ τH(S),
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 2. 
Proof of Theorem 1: From Lemmas 1-3, the proof of Theorem
1 is completed. 
As we will see in Section II-C, the above lower bounds
are tight since our construction will meet all the above lower
bounds with equalities. Therefore, we define optimality of
constructions of (k, n)-TR-SS as follows.
Definition 3. A construction of secure (k, n)-TR-SS is said to
be optimal if it meets equality in every bound of (i)-(iii) in
Theorem 1.
Remark 2. The secret sharing scheme such that the size of
each participant’s share is equal to that of the secret is often
called an ideal secret sharing scheme. The construction of
(k, n)-TR-SS in Section II-C is optimal, hence, in this sense
we achieve ideal (k, n)-TR-SS. In terms of share-size, an
interesting point is that the timed-release property can be
realized without any additional redundancy on the share-size.
Therefore in the sense of the bound on share-size, our results
are also regarded as the extension of traditional secret sharing
schemes.
C. Direct Construction
We propose a direct construction of (k, n)-TR-SS. In
addition, it is shown that our construction is optimal. The detail
of our construction of (k, n)-TR-SS Π is given as follows.
a) Initialize. Let q be a prime power, where q >
max(n, τ), and Fq be the finite field with q ele-
ments. We assume that the identity of each participant
Pi is encoded as Pi ∈ Fq\{0}. Also, we assume
T = {1, 2, . . . , τ} ⊂ Fq\{0} by using appropriate
encoding. First, TA chooses uniformly at random τ
distinct numbers r(j)(1 ≤ j ≤ τ) from Fq . TA sends
a secret-key sk := (r(1), . . . , r(τ)) to TS and D via
secure channels, respectively.
b) Share. First, D chooses a secret s ∈ Fq. Also, D spec-
ifies the time t at which participants can reconstruct
the secret. Next, D randomly chooses a polynomial
f(x) := c(t) +
∑k−1
i=1 aix
i over Fq, where c(t) is
computed by c(t) := s+ r(t) and each coefficient ai
is randomly and uniformly chosen from Fq. Finally,
D computes u(t)i := f(Pi)(i = 1, 2, . . . , n) and sends
(u
(t)
i , t) to Pi(i = 1, 2, . . . , n) via a secure channel.
c) Extract. For sk and time t ∈ T , TS broadcasts t-th
key r(t) as a time-signal at time t to all participants
via a (authenticated) broadcast channel.
d) Reconstruct. First, a set of at least k participants A =
{Pi1 , Pi2 , . . . , Pik} ∈ PS(P , k, k) computes c(t) by
Lagrange interpolation:
c(t) =
k∑
j=1
(
∏
l 6=j
Pij
Pij − Pil
)f(Pij ),
from their k shares. After receiving ts(t) = r(t), they
can compute and get s = c(t) − r(t).
The security and optimality of the above construction is
stated as follows.
Theorem 2. The resulting (k, n)-TR-SS Π by the above con-
struction is secure and optimal.
Proof. First, we show the proof of (i) in Definition 2. Assume
that any k−1 participants F = {Pi1 , . . . , Pik−1} ∈ PS(P , k−
1, k− 1) try to guess c(t) by using their shares. Note that they
know r(t) = c(t) − s and
f(Pij ) = (1, Pij , . . . , P
k−1
ij
)


c(t)
a1
.
.
.
ak−1

 ,
for j = 1, . . . , k−1. Thus, they can know the following matrix:


1 Pi1 · · · P
k−1
i1
1 Pi2 · · · P
k−1
i2
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1 Pik−1 · · · P
k−1
ik−1




c(t)
a1
.
.
.
ak−1

 . (5)
However, from (5), they cannot guess at least one element of
(c(t), a1, . . . , ak−1) with probability larger than 1/q. There-
fore, H(S | UF , T I(1), . . . , T I(τ)) = H(S) for any F ∈
PS(P , 1, k − 1) and any t ∈ T .
Next, we show the proof of (ii) in Definition 2. Without
loss of generality, we suppose that τ is a specified time, and
that all participants try to guess r(τ) by using c(τ) and time-
signals at all the time except the time τ , since they obtain
c(τ) = s + r(τ) from their shares. They get τ − 1 time-
signals r(1), . . . , r(τ−1). However, since each time-signal is
chosen uniformly at random from Fq, they can guess r(τ)
only with probability 1/q. By the security of one-time pad, we
have H(S | U1, . . . , Un, T I(1), . . . , T (τ−1)) = H(S). Hence,
for any A ∈ PS(P , k, n) and for any t ∈ T , we have
H(S | U
(t)
A , T I
(1), . . . , T I(t−1), T I(t+1), . . . , T (τ)) = H(S).
Finally, it is straightforward to see that the construction
satisfies all the equalities of lower bounds in Theorem 1.
Therefore, the above construction is optimal. 
III. (k1, k2, n)-TIMED-RELEASE SECRET SHARING
SCHEME
We propose (k1, k2, n)-TR-SS, where k1 and k2 are thresh-
old values with 1 ≤ k1 ≤ k2 ≤ n. (k1, k2, n)-TR-SS
can realize timed-release functionality—a secret can be re-
constructed from at least k1 shares and a time-signal at the
specified time—and traditional secret sharing functionality—a
secret can be also reconstructed from only at least k2 shares—
simultaneously. In the case that k = k1 = k2, (k, k, n)-TR-
SS can be considered as traditional (k, n)-SS (for details, see
Remark 3).
A. Model and Security Definition
In this section, we propose a model and a security def-
inition of (k1, k2, n)-TR-SS. First, we introduce a model
of (k1, k2, n)-TR-SS. In (k1, k2, n)-TR-SS, there are same
entities and sets as those of (k, n)-TR-SS. The main difference
from (k, n)-TR-SS is that a dealer D can specify two kinds of
threshold values, k1 and k2 with k1 ≤ k2 ≤ n: k1 indicates the
number of participants who can reconstruct a secret s with the
time-signal at the time specified by the dealer; and k2 indicates
the number of participants who can reconstruct s without any
time-signals. We give the definition of (k1, k2, n)-TR-SS as
follows.
Definition 4 ((k1, k2, n)-TR-SS). A (k1, k2, n)-timed-release
secret sharing scheme ((k1, k2, n)-TR-SS) Θ involves n + 3
entities, TA,D, P1, . . . , Pn, and TS, and consists of five
phases, Initialize, Extract, Share, Reconstruct with time-signals
and Reconstruct without time-signals, and five finite spaces,
S,SK,U , T , and T I . Θ is executed based on the following
phases as follows.
a) Initialize. This phase follows the same procedure as
that of (k, n)-TR-SS (see Definition 1).
b) Share. A dealer D randomly selects a secret s ∈ S
according to PS . Then, D chooses k1, k2 and n,
and specifies future time t ∈ T when at least
k1 participants can reconstruct s. Then, on input
the secret s, the specified time t and a secret-key
sk ∈ SK, D computes a share u(t)i ∈ U
(t)
i for
every Pi (i = 1, 2, . . . , n). And then, D sends a
pair of the share and specified time, (u(t)i , t), to Pi
(i = 1, 2, . . . , n) via a secure channel, respectively.
c) Extract. This phase follows the same procedure as
that of (k, n)-TR-SS (see Definition 1).
d) Reconstruct with time-signals. At the specified time
t, any set of participants A = {Pi1 , . . . , Pij} ∈
PS(P , k1, k2 − 1) can reconstruct the secret s by
using their shares (u(t)i1 , . . . , u
(t)
ij
) (k1 ≤ j < k2) and
a time-signal of the specified time ts(t).
e) Reconstruct without time-signals. At anytime, any set
of participants Aˆ = {Pi1 , . . . , Pij} ∈ PS(P , k2, n)
can reconstruct the secret s by using only their shares
(u
(t)
i1
, . . . , u
(t)
ij
) (k2 ≤ j ≤ n).
In the above model, we assume that Θ meets the following
correctness properties:
1) If D correctly completes the phase Share and TS
correctly completes the phase Extract, then, for all
possible i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, t ∈ T , s ∈ S, u(t)i ∈
U
(t)
i , and ts(t) ∈ T I
(t)
, it holds that any A ∈
PS(P , k1, k2−1) will correctly reconstruct the secret
s at the end of phase Reconstruct with time-signals,
namely,
H(S | U
(t)
A , T I
(t)) = 0.
2) If D correctly completes the phase Share, then, for
all possible i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, t ∈ T , s ∈ S, and
u
(t)
i ∈ U
(t)
i , it holds that any Aˆ ∈ PS(P , k2, n) will
correctly reconstruct the secret s at the end of phase
Reconstruct without time-signals, namely,
H(S | U
(t)
Aˆ
) = 0.
Next, we formalize a security definition of (k1, k2, n)-TR-
SS in a similar way to that of (k, n)-TR-SS as follows.
Definition 5 (Security of (k1, k2, n)-TR-SS). Let Θ be
(k1, k2, n)-TR-SS. Θ is said to be secure if the following
conditions are satisfied:
(i) For any F ∈ PS(P , 1, k1 − 1) and any t ∈ T , it
holds that
H(S | U
(t)
F , T I
(1), . . . , T I(τ)) = H(S).
(ii) For any Fˆ ∈ PS(P , k1, k2 − 1) and any t ∈ T , it
holds that
H(S | U
(t)
Fˆ
, T I(1), . . . , T I(t−1), T I(t+1), . . . , T I(τ))
= H(S).
In Definition 5, intuitively, the meaning of (i) is the same
as that of (k, n)-TR-SS (Definition 2), and the meaning of
the condition (ii) is explained that no information on a secret
is obtained by any set of at least k1 but no more than k2
participants, even if they obtain time-signals at all the time
except the specified time. We also consider a more strong
security notion in a similar to (k, n)-TR-SS, however, we do
not consider such a strong notion for the same reason as in
the case of (k, n)-TR-SS.
Remark 3. In the case that k = k1 = k2, the model and
security definition of secure (k, k, n)-TR-SS (Definitions 1 and
2) are the same as those of traditional (k, n)-SS. Namely,
our model of (k1, k2, n)-TR-SS also includes the model of
traditional secret sharing schemes. Therefore, the model and
security definition of (k1, k2, n)-TR-SS can be regarded as a
natural extension of those of traditional secret sharing schemes.
B. Lower Bounds
In this section, we show lower bounds on sizes of shares,
time-signals, and secret-keys required for secure (k1, k2, n)-
TR-SS as follows.
Theorem 3. Let Θ be any secure (k1, k2, n)-TR-SS. Then, for
any i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and for any t ∈ T , we have
(i) H(U
(t)
i ) ≥ H(S).
Moreover, if the above lower bound holds with equality (i.e.
H(U
(t)
i ) = H(S) for any i and t), we have
(ii) H(TI(t)) ≥ (k2 − k1)H(S),
(iii) H(SK) ≥ τ(k2 − k1)H(S).
The proof follows from the following lemmas.
Lemma 4. H(U (t)i ) ≥ H(S) for any i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and
any t ∈ T .
Proof. The proof of this lemma can be proved in a way similar
to the proof in [11, Theorem 1]. For arbitrary i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
we take a subset Bi ∈ PS(P \ {Pi}, k2 − 1, k2 − 1) of
participants. Then, for any t ∈ T , we have
H(U
(t)
i ) ≥ H(U
(t)
i | U
(t)
Bi
, T I(1), . . . , T I(t−1)) (6)
≥ I(S;U
(t)
i | U
(t)
Bi
, T I(1), . . . , T I(t−1))
= H(S | U
(t)
Bi
, T I(1), . . . , T I(t−1)) (7)
= H(S), (8)
where (7) follows from the correctness of (k1, k2, n)-TR-SS
and (8) follows from the condition (ii) in Definition 5. 
Lemma 5. If H(U (t)i ) = H(S) for any i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and
t ∈ T , H(TI(t)) ≥ H(TI(t) | TI(1), . . . , T I(t−1)) ≥ (k2 −
k1)H(S) for any t ∈ T .
Proof. The statement is true in the case that k1 = k2, since
Shannon entropy is non-negative. Therefore, in the following,
we assume k1 < k2. For arbitrary i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, we take a
subset Bi ∈ PS(P \ {Pi}, k2 − 1, k2 − 1) of participants. For
any t ∈ T , we have
H(TI(t))
≥H(TI(t) | TI(1), . . . , T I(t−1))
≥I(TI(t);U
(t)
1 , U
(t)
2 , . . . , U
(t)
n | TI
(1), . . . , T I(t−1))
=H(U
(t)
1 , U
(t)
2 , . . . , U
(t)
n | TI
(1), . . . , T I(t−1))
−H(U
(t)
1 , U
(t)
2 , . . . , U
(t)
n | TI
(1), . . . , T I(t))
=H(U
(t)
1 , . . . , U
(t)
k1
| TI(1), . . . , T I(t−1))
+H(U
(t)
k1+1
, . . . , U
(t)
k2
| TI(1), . . . , T I(t−1), U
(t)
1 , . . . , U
(t)
k1
)
+H(U
(t)
k2+1
, . . . , U (t)n | TI
(1), . . . , T I(t−1), U
(t)
1 , . . . , U
(t)
k2
)
−H(U
(t)
1 , . . . , U
(t)
k1
| TI(1), . . . , T I(t))
−H(U
(t)
k1+1
, . . . , U
(t)
k2
| TI(1), . . . , T I(t), U
(t)
1 , . . . , U
(t)
k1
)
−H(U
(t)
k2+1
, . . . , U (t)n | TI
(1), . . . , T I(t), U
(t)
1 , . . . , U
(t)
k2
)
≥H(U
(t)
1 , . . . , U
(t)
k1
| TI(1), . . . , T I(t))
+H(U
(t)
k1+1
, . . . , U
(t)
k2
| TI(1), . . . , T I(t−1), U
(t)
1 , . . . , U
(t)
k1
)
+H(U
(t)
k2+1
, . . . , U (t)n | TI
(1), . . . , T I(t), U
(t)
1 , . . . , U
(t)
k2
)
−H(U
(t)
1 , . . . , U
(t)
k1
| TI(1), . . . , T I(t))
−H(U
(t)
k1+1
, . . . , U
(t)
k2
| TI(1), . . . , T I(t), U
(t)
1 , . . . , U
(t)
k1
)
−H(U
(t)
k2+1
, . . . , U (t)n | TI
(1), . . . , T I(t), U
(t)
1 , . . . , U
(t)
k2
)
=H(U
(t)
k1+1
, . . . , U
(t)
k2
| TI(1), . . . , T I(t−1), U
(t)
1 , . . . , U
(t)
k1
)
−H(U
(t)
k1+1
, . . . , U
(t)
k2
| TI(1), . . . , T I(t), U
(t)
1 , . . . , U
(t)
k1
)
≥
k2∑
i=k1+1
H(U
(t)
i | TI
(1), . . . , T I(t−1), U
(t)
Bi
)
−
k2∑
i=k1+1
H(U
(t)
i | TI
(1), . . . , T I(t), U
(t)
1 , . . . , U
(t)
i−1)
=(k2 − k1)H(S), (9)
where (9) follows from (6) in the proof of Lemma 4, the
assumption of H(U (t)i ) = H(S), and the following claim.
Claim 1. If k1 < k2 and H(U (t)i ) = H(S) for any i ∈
{1, 2, . . . , n} and t ∈ T , H(U (t)i | UAi , T I(t)) = 0 for any
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, any Ai ∈ PS(P \{Pi}, k1, k2−1), and any
t ∈ T .
Proof. First, for arbitrary i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, we take subsets
Bi := PS(P \ {Pi}, k1 − 1, k1 − 1) and Ai := PS(P \
{Pi}, k1, k2 − 1) of participants such that Bi ⊂ Ai. Then,
for any t ∈ T , we have
H(U
(t)
i )
≥H(U
(t)
i | U
(t)
Bi
, T I(t))
≥H(U
(t)
i | U
(t)
Bi
, T I(t))−H(U
(t)
i | U
(t)
Bi
, T I(t), S) (10)
=I(U
(t)
i ;S | U
(t)
Bi
, T I(t))
=H(S | U
(t)
Bi
, T I(t))−H(S | U
(t)
Bi
, U
(t)
i , T I
(t))
=H(S | U
(t)
Bi
, T I(t)) (11)
=H(S), (12)
where (11) follows form the correctness of (k1, k2, n)-TR-SS
and (12) follows from the condition (i) in Definition 5.
From (10) and the assumption of H(U (t)i ) = H(S), we
have
H(U
(t)
i | U
(t)
Bi
, T I(t))
=H(U
(t)
i | U
(t)
Bi
, T I(t))−H(U
(t)
i | U
(t)
Bi
, T I(t), S).
Therefore, we have
H(U
(t)
i | U
(t)
Bi
, T I(t), S) = 0.
Hence, we have
H(U
(t)
i | U
(t)
Ai
, T I(t)) =H(U
(t)
i | U
(t)
Ai
, T I(t), S)
≤H(U
(t)
i | U
(t)
Bi
, T I(t), S)
=0.
Since H(U (t)i | U
(t)
Ai
, T I(t)) ≥ 0, we have H(U (t)i |
U
(t)
Ai
, T I(t)) = 0. 
Proof of Lemma 5: From the above claim, the proof of Lemma
5 is completed. 
Lemma 6. If H(U (t)i ) = H(S) for any i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and
t ∈ T , H(SK) ≥ τ(k2 − k1)H(S).
Proof. We can prove in a similar way to the proof of Lemma
3. We have
H(SK) ≥ I(TI(1), . . . , T I(τ);SK)
= H(TI(1), . . . , T I(τ))−H(TI(1), . . . , T I(τ) | SK)
= H(TI(1), . . . , T I(τ))
=
τ∑
t=1
H(TI(t) | TI(1), . . . , T I(t−1))
≥ τ(k2 − k1)H(S),
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 5. 
Proof of Theorem 3: From Lemmas 4-6, the proof of Theorem
3 is completed. 
As we will see in Section III-C2, the lower bounds in
Theorem 3 are tight since our construction will meet all
the above lower bounds with equalities. Therefore, we define
optimality of constructions of (k1, k2, n)-TR-SS as follows.
Definition 6. A construction of secure (k1, k2, n)-TR-SS is
said to be optimal if it meets equality in every bound of (i)-(iii)
in Theorem 3.
C. Construction
We propose a direct construction of (k1, k2, n)-TR-SS. In
addition, it is shown that our construction is optimal. Before
that, we show a naive construction based on (k1, n)-TR-SS
and (k2, n)-SS, which is not optimal.
1) Naive Construction: Our idea of a naive construction is
a combination of (k1, n)-TR-SS (Section II-C) and Shamir’s
(k2, n)-SS [1].
a) Initialize. Let q be a prime power, where q >
max(n, τ), and Fq be the finite field with q ele-
ments. We assume that the identity of each participant
Pi is encoded as Pi ∈ Fq\{0}. Also, we assume
T = {1, 2, . . . , τ} ⊂ Fq\{0} by using appropriate
encoding. First, TA chooses uniformly at random τ
distinct numbers r(j)(1 ≤ j ≤ τ) from Fq . TA sends
a secret-key sk := (r(1), . . . , r(τ)) to TS and D via
secure channels, respectively.
b) Share. First, D chooses a secret s ∈ Fq . Also,
D specifies the time t when at least k1 partici-
pants can reconstruct the secret and chooses t-th key
r(t). Next, D randomly chooses two polynomials
f1(x) := s + r
(t) +
∑k1−1
i=1 a1ix
i and f2(x) :=
s +
∑k2−1
i=1 a2ix
i over Fq, where each coefficient is
randomly and uniformly chosen from Fq. Then, D
computes u(t)i := (f1(Pi), f2(Pi)). Finally, D sends
(u
(t)
i , t) to Pi(i = 1, 2, . . . , n) via a secure channel.
c) Extract. For sk and time t ∈ T , TS broadcasts t-th
key r(t) as a time-signal at time t to all participants
via a (authenticated) broadcast channel.
d) Reconstruct with time-signals. First,
A = {Pi1 , Pi2 , . . . , Pik1 } ∈ PS(P , k1, k1) computes
s+ r(t) by Lagrange interpolation:
s+ r(t) =
k1∑
j=1
(
∏
l 6=j
Pij
Pij − Pil
)f1(Pij ),
from (f1(Pi1 ), . . . , f1(Pik1 )). After receiving ts
(t) =
r(t), they can compute and get s = s+ r(t) − ts(t).
e) Reconstruct without time-signals. any
Aˆ = {Pi1 , Pi2 , . . . , Pik2 } ∈ PS(P , k2, k2) computes
s =
k2∑
j=1
(
∏
l 6=j
Pij
Pij − Pil
)f2(Pij ),
by Lagrange interpolation from
(f2(Pi1), . . . , f2(Pik2 )).
It is easy to see that the above construction is secure, since
this construction is a simple combination of (k1, n)-TR-SS and
Shamir’s (k2, n)-SS. Also, the above construction is simple,
however not optimal since the resulting share-size is twice as
large as that of secrets.
2) Optimal (but Restricted4) Construction: To achieve an
optimal construction, we use the technique as in [13]: In the
phase Share, the dealer computes public parameters, and the
public parameters are broadcasted to participants or else stored
on a publicly accessible authenticated bulletin board. The detail
of our construction is given as follows.
a) Initialize. Let q be a prime power, where q >
max(n, τ), and Fq be the finite field with q ele-
ments. We assume that the identity of each participant
4In this optimal construction, a dealer is only allowed to choose k1 and k2
such that k2 − k1 ≤ ℓ, where ℓ is determined by TA in the phase Initialize.
In this sense, this construction is restricted.
Pi is encoded as Pi ∈ Fq\{0}. Also, we assume
T = {1, 2, . . . , τ} ⊂ Fq\{0} by using appropriate
encoding. First, TA chooses ℓ, which is the maximum
difference between k2 and k1. Note that k1 and k2
will be determined by a dealer D in the phase Share.
Then, TA chooses τℓ numbers r(t)i (1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ) and
(1 ≤ t ≤ τ) from Fq uniformly at random. TA sends
a secret-key sk := {(r(t)1 , r
(t)
2 , . . . , r
(t)
ℓ )}1≤t≤τ to TS
and D via secure channels, respectively.
b) Share. First, D randomly selects a secret s ∈ Fq,
and chooses k1, k2 and n such that k2 − k1 ≤ ℓ.
Also, D specifies the time t when at least k1 partic-
ipants can reconstruct the secret. Next, D randomly
chooses a polynomial f(x) := s +
∑k2−1
i=1 aix
i
over Fq, where each coefficient ai is randomly and
uniformly chosen from Fq. Then, D computes a
share u(t)i := f(Pi) and a public parameter p
(t)
i :=
ak1−1+i + r
(t)
i (i = 1, 2, . . . , k2 − k1). Finally, D
sends (u(t)i , t) to Pi(i = 1, 2, . . . , n) via a secure
channel and discloses (p(t)1 , . . . , p
(t)
k2−k1
).
c) Extract. For sk and time t ∈ T , TS broadcasts a
time-signal at time t, ts(t) := (r(t)1 , r
(t)
2 , . . . , r
(t)
ℓ )
to all participants via a (authenticated) broadcast
channel.
d) Reconstruct with time-signals. Suppose that all par-
ticipants receive ts(t) = (r(t)1 , r
(t)
2 , . . . , r
(t)
ℓ ). Let
A = {Pi1 , Pi2 , . . . , Pik1 } ∈ PS(P , k1, k1) be a set
of any k1 participants. First, each Pij ∈ A computes
a
(t)
k1−1+i
= p
(t)
i − r
(t)
i (i = 1, 2, . . . , k2 − k1) and
constructs g(x) :=
∑k2−1
k1
aix
i
. Then, each Pij com-
putes h(Pij ) := f(Pij )−g(Pij ) (j = 1, . . . , k1) such
that h(x) := s+
∑k1−1
i=1 aix
i
. Then, they compute
s =
k1∑
j=1
(
∏
l 6=j
Pij
Pij − Pil
)h(Pij ),
by Lagrange interpolation from
(h(Pi1 ), . . . , h(Pik1 )).
e) Reconstruct without time-signals. any
Aˆ = {Pi1 , Pi2 , . . . , Pik2 } ∈ PS(P , k2, k2) computes
s =
k2∑
j=1
(
∏
l 6=j
Pij
Pij − Pil
)f(Pij ),
by Lagrange interpolation from their k2 shares.
The security and optimality of the above construction is
stated as follows.
Theorem 4. The resulting (k1, k2, n)-TR-SS Θ by the above
construction is secure. Moreover, it is optimal if k2 − k1 = ℓ.
Proof. First, we show the proof of (i) in Definition 5. Assume
that k1− 1 participants F = {Pi1 , . . . , Pik1−1} ∈ PS(P , k1−
1, k1 − 1) try to guess s by using their shares, public param-
eters, and all time-signals. F can compute g(x) from public
parameters and the time-signal at the specified time, hence they
can get h(Pil) = f(Pil) − g(Pil) (l = 1, . . . , k1 − 1). Thus,
they can know the following matrix:


1 Pi1 · · · P
k1−1
i1
1 Pi2 · · · P
k1−1
i2
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1 Pik1−1 · · · P
k1−1
ik1−1




s
a1
.
.
.
ak−1

 . (13)
However, from (5), they cannot guess at least one element of
(s, a1, . . . , ak1−1) with probability larger than 1/q. Therefore,
for any F ∈ PS(P , 1, k1− 1) and any t ∈ T , we have H(S |
U
(t)
F , T I
(1), . . . , T I(τ)) = H(S).
Next, we show the proof of (ii) in Definition 5. Without
loss of generality, we suppose that τ is a specified time,
that k2 − k1 = ℓ, and that k2 − 1 participants try to guess
s by using their shares, public parameters, and time-signals
at all the time except the time τ . First, they cannot guess
at least one coefficient of f(x) with probability larger than
1/q since the degree of f(x) is at most k2 − 1. Therefore,
they attempt to guess one of ak1 , . . . , ak2−1 by using their
k2 − 1 shares, public parameters and τ − 1 time-signals,
since if they obtain any one of these coefficient, they can
get f∗(Pil) (l = 1, . . . , k2 − 1) such that the degree of
f∗(x) is k2 − 2 and reconstruct s by Lagrange interpolation.
They know τ − 1 time-signals, however, these time-signals
{(r
(j)
1 , . . . , r
(j)
ℓ )}1≤j≤τ−1 are independent of the time-signal
(r
(τ)
1 , . . . , r
(τ)
ℓ ) at τ . Hence, by the security of one-time pad,
they cannot guess each ak1−1+i (= p
(τ)
i − r
(τ)
i ) (1 ≤ i ≤
k2 − k1) with probability larger than 1/q since each r(τ)i
is chosen from Fq uniformly at random. Therefore, we have
H(S | U
(τ)
l1
, . . . , U
(τ)
lk2−1
, T I(1), . . . , T (τ−1)) = H(S). Hence,
for any A ∈ PS(P , k1, k2 − 1) and any t ∈ T , we have
H(S | U
(t)
A , T I
(1), . . . , T I(t−1), T I(t+1), . . . , T (τ)) = H(S).
Finally, if k2 − k1 = ℓ, it is straightforward to see that
the construction satisfies all the equalities of lower bounds in
Theorem 3. Therefore, the above construction is optimal if
k2 − k1 = ℓ. 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we first studied two kinds of secret shar-
ing schemes with timed-release security in the information-
theoretic setting, (k, n)-TR-SS and (k1, k2, n)-TR-SS. Specif-
ically, we defined a model and security for each scheme, and
derived tight lower bounds on sizes of shares, time-signals, and
secret-keys required for each scheme. Moreover, we respec-
tively proposed optimal direct constructions of both schemes.
These results showed that information-theoretic timed-release
security can be realized in secret sharing schemes without any
redundancy on share-sizes.
In a similar way, it is expected that information-theoretic
timed-release security can be realized for secret sharing
schemes with any access structure without any redundancy
on share-sizes. It would be also interesting to extend our
results to timed-release verifiable secret sharing schemes, and
furthermore, to multiparty computation schemes with timed-
release security.
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